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I. INTRODUCTION

Even before the negotiation of the 1922 Colorado River Compact'
("Compact"), the Upper Division States in the Colorado River Basin
were concerned about securing and protecting a reliable water supply
for their use and development.
That concern persists, and is
manifested in their positions relative to current issues that include
endangered species; marketing, leasing, and banking; Indian reserved
rights; salinity; and the needs and values of the inexorable inmigration of people to the West. The Upper Basin 3 has also felt itself
under constant threat of the prospect that rapid development in
California could give rise to a priority of use-ultimately usurping
future development and economic opportunity in the Upper Basin.
As a result, issues in California have always been at the top of the
Upper Basin's agenda and remain a paramount Upper Basin concern.
California's dependence on the use of water surplus to its basic
apportionment under the Law of the River' represents the most
1. Colorado River Compact, 123 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-61101 to -104 (2000) [hereinafter Compact].
2. The Compact defines "States of the Upper Division" to mean the states of
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. § 37-61-101, art. II(e).
3. The Compact defines "Upper Basin" to mean those parts of the States of
Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming within the Colorado River Basin
above Lee Ferry, and also areas in those states outside of the Basin to which Colorado
River water is diverted for beneficial use. Id. § 37-61-101, art. II(f).
4. The term "basic apportionment" refers to the amount of water that can be
beneficially consumed by a Lower Division state pursuant to Article II(B)(1) of the
Decree of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 342
(1964), and under a "Normal" determination by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant
to Article 111(3) (a) of the Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado
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current "California problem." For many years, California has been
using as much as 800,000 acre-feet in excess of its basic
apportionment. Increasing water use in Arizona and Nevada that has
pushed total water use in the Lower Basin 6 over its Compact allocation
has exacerbated the problem. As a result, the Secretary of the Interior
and the Basin states, other than California,7 have pressured California
water supply agencies to reduce their dependence on surplus
Colorado River flows. Additionally, they have demanded California
meet its legal obligation to live within its means under the Law of the
River.
The reason for such mandates is simple and illustrates why solving
the California problem is of fundamental importance to the other
states. If California is allowed to continue to exceed its basic
apportionment in the face of increasing need in the other Basin states,
and if established allocations are not enforced, then the foundation of
the Law of the River-the allocation of the right to consume water
among the states-may be meaningless. This loss of security of
allocation would undermine the certainty and reliability of supply for
water users in each of the Basin states, thereby making resolution of
other management and environmental issues on the Colorado River
virtually impossible, short of divisive, costly, and time-consuming
litigation. A reliable allocation of supply provides a legal framework
through which the federal government and the states can manage the
Colorado River to meet changing demands and values. Therefore,
each state has a vital stake in assuring the maintenance and
enforcement of that framework.
The Law of the River, of which the Compact is the foundation, is
the product of economic need, social conflict, politics, and law. To
appreciate fully this set of laws, one must understand the historical
context that created the laws and the motives of those who fought for
and negotiated each compromise. Through that understanding, one
River Reservoirs, 35 Fed. Reg. 8951 (June 10, 1970) [hereinafter Operating Criteria].
Article 11(d) of the Compact defines "States of the Lower Division" to mean Arizona,
California, and Nevada. Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art. 11(d). The basic
apportionment of the Lower Division States is as follows: Arizona-2.8 million acre-feet
per year ("m.a.f./yr"); California-4.4 m.a.f./yr; and Nevada-0.3 m.a.f./yr. Arizona, 376
U.S. at 342. The Decree in Arizona v. California and the Operating Criteria make
provisions for "shortage" and "surplus" conditions, when the states of the Lower
Division can use less or more, respectively, than their basic apportionments. Id.; see
also OperatingCriteria,at 8951.
5. The "Law of the River" refers to a body of law affecting the interstate and
international use, management, and allocation of water in the Colorado River System,
including the 1922 Colorado River Compact, the Mexican Water Treaty of 1944, the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, several United States Supreme Court decisions,
the Decree in Arizona v. California, and a host of federal laws and administrative
regulations.
6. Article II(g) of the Compact defines "Lower Basin" to mean those parts of
Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah within the Colorado River Basin
below Lee Ferry, and also areas in those states outside of the Basin to which Colorado
River water is diverted for beneficial use. Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art.
H(g).
7. Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
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can discern the policy underpinnings of the current positions of the
states, tribes, and water agencies that rely on the Colorado River's
supply. Therefore, this article will examine the historical context of
the Law of the River before reviewing the evolution and potential
resolution of the current problem of California's dependence on
surplus flows.
This article will consist of two parts. Part I will review the
development of the Law of the River from an Upper Basin perspective.
It will focus on the motivations of the Upper Division states,
particularly Colorado, in pressing for the Compact and later laws.
These motivations were premised on key themes or principles that
remain relevant today. Part I also will summarize a few of the major
unresolved issues under the Law of the River that create uncertainty,
and therefore motivate the Upper Basin to press the California issue.
Part II of the article, which will appear in a later edition of the
University of Denver Water Law Review, will use the historical perspective
of Part I as a basis to review the history of discussions over the last ten
years between the states, the Department of the Interior, Indian
Tribes, and other water users. These discussions have resulted in
historic proposals and agreements by which California agencies will in
fact work toward reducing their overall water use. Since, like other
states, California requires some reliability of supply, interim surplus
guidelines for the operation of Colorado River Reservoirs will facilitate
this "California Plan." Adopted by the Secretary of the Interior, these
procedures will guide operations of the reservoirs in a way that will
assist California in achieving a "soft landing" to water use within its
basic allocation.
II. THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT
The development of the Colorado River began when the early
irrigation of the Imperial Valley in California involved a canal route
through Mexico. The canal route required the cooperation of the
Mexican government and implicated international relations between
This international complication
the United States and Mexico.'
for an "All-American Canal"
Valley
the
Imperial
in
the
desire
increased
the
need to construct large
and led to discussion and debate over
storage facilities on the lower Colorado River.9 Irrigation interests in
California clamored for construction of a large dam to reduce the
threat of floods, such as those that occurred between 1905 and 1907
and created the Salton Sea.' These interests looked to enhance the
reliability and security of their water supply. Competing proposals for
development of a large hydroelectric project augmented the demand
for a large reservoir.
It soon became clear that such comprehensive financing and

8. NoRRis HUNDLEY, JR., WATERAND THE WEST 22-23 (1975).
9. Id. at 45-52.
10. Id. at 27.
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development required the assistance of the federal government.
Comments of federal employees and commentators, such as John
Wesley Powell, Richard J. Hinton, and Arthur Powell Davis, further
fueled the debate. As early as 1878, they argued for federal control
over the comprehensive development of the Colorado River."
However, federal assistance also required the cooperation of the other
Basin states, which successfully blocked any financing proposals in
Congress. The Upper Basin was anxious about the potential rate of
development in the Lower Basin and was concerned that the water
supply forecasts of the federal government might be unreasonably
optimistic. 12 Thus, the California proposals threatened the security
and reliability of the Upper Basin supply.
A proposal made in 1920 by Delph Carpenter of Colorado to the
League of the Southwest ("League"), in his capacity as legal advisor to
Colorado's Governor, broke the stalemate."3 Carpenter urged the
states to use the powers retained by them under the Compact Clause
of the United States Constitution to equitably apportion the right to
use the waters of the Basin among them. Carpenter designed his
proposal to protect the security of future development opportunity in
the other states, while allowing development for the benefit of
California to proceed. The proposal provided the vehicle for the
League to urge Congress to construct an All-American Canal and flood
control storage on the lower Colorado River, with a compact as a
necessary prerequisite. 5 Hence in 1921, Congress authorized the
appointment of a federal6 commissioner and approved the negotiation
of an interstate compact.'
Carpenter did not make his proposal out of thin air, nor did he do
so without a clear understanding of the goals he wanted to achieve in
the subsequent compact negotiations. He had in mind several basic
principles he thought a compact could establish, which ultimately
would inure to the benefit of the Upper Basin and to Colorado in
particular. First, Carpenter sought assurance that Colorado could
develop a share of the Colorado River in perpetuity, as needs and
economic conditions dictated. Second, although he was a staunch
proponent of the prior appropriation doctrine and the belief that a
water right is a property right, Carpenter sought to eliminate the
operation of the prior appropriation doctrine as applied on an
interstate basis. Third, Carpenter was adamant in his defense of state
sovereignty and sought to preserve state autonomy over intrastate
water appropriation and administration. Fourth, he felt strongly that
11. Id. at 8-9.
12. Id. at 96-97.
13. Daniel Tyler, Delphus Emoy Carpenterand the ColoradoRiver Compact of 1922, 1 U.
DENy. WATER L. REv. 228, 240 (1998).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.3. The most complete discussion of the Compact
Clause remains Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE LJ. 685 (1925).
15. HUNDLEY, supra note 8, at 90-93.
16. Act of Aug. 19, 1921, ch. 72, 42 Stat. 171, 171-72.
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litigation was the interstate equivalent of war and sought to avoid the
threat of litigation among the states as well as between the states and
the federal government. Finally, Carpenter saw development of the
Colorado River as key to reliability and security of supply and sought to
create a foundation for its comprehensive development and
regulation.
Although the principles of the Upper Basin in proposing and
negotiating the compact were clear, it is worthwhile discussing them in
some detail, since the same motivations underlie the policy positions
of many states today.
A.

THE UPPER BASIN SOUGHT THE ASSURANCE OF THE ABILTY TO DEVELOP A
SHARE OF THE COLORADO RIVER IN PERPETUIY, AS NEEDS AND ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS DICTATE

Delph Carpenter looked at early United States Supreme Court
cases and studied the constitutional foundation of the relationships
In his view, under
between state and federal governments.
international law, a lower nation could not arrest the development of
an upper nation and deny to its inhabitants the use of water. However,
while Carpenter felt the upper nation was entitled to make full use of
waters, the nations, as a matter of international comity, could allocate
waters through a treaty. 7 Carpenter believed that before formation of
the Union, the territories were independent sovereigns and
surrendered only specific powers to the federal government. Under
the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the states
retained specific powers not surrendered. The power to compact was
founded upon the same principle as the power in the Supreme Court
to settle controversies between the states, or between the United States
and a state. These powers assume the respective sovereignty of the
states and the federal government. 8 As a result of these sovereign
powers, Carpenter believed the states could, with the consent of
Congress under the Compact Clause, agree to a perpetual allocation of
water. Through this allocation, Carpenter's intent was to preserve

17. The Harmon Doctrine may have influenced Carpenter's views. The Harmon
Doctrine was an 1895 U.S. Attorney General's opinion advising the Secretary of State
that the United States could exercise absolute sovereignty over the Rio Grande River
in the United States. Since that time, international law has evolved to reflect more
equitable principles. See A. Dan Tarlock, InternationalWater Law and the Protection of
River System Ecosystem Integrity, 10 BYUJ. PUB. L. 181 (1996).
18. Carpenter stated: "In other words, the States of the Union, by consent of
Congress, have the same power to enter into compacts with each other as do
independent nations, upon all matters not delegated to the Federal Government."
Historical Memorandum In Re Colorado River and Brief of Law of Interstate Compacts:
Hearings on H.R. 6821 Before the HouseJudiciary Comm., 67th Cong. (1921) (brief written

by Delph E. Carpenter) [hereinafter HistoricalMemorandum]; see also Tyler, supra note
13, at 232-35.

19. Delph E. Carpenter, Application of the Reserve Treaty Powers of the States to
Interstate Water Controversies, Address before the Colorado Bar Association (1921),
in 24 CoLo. BAR ASS'N 1, 1-29 (1921) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation
Board).
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the Upper Basin's right to develop water resources as economic needs
dictated."
The final Compact achieved the Upper Basin's desire for a
perpetual allocation.
Article III(a) of the Compact apportions
exclusive beneficial use of water to each Basin "in perpetuity" despite
extensive discussions of possible time limits in the negotiations." In
the ultimate consent to the Compact, the congressional debates
underscore the clear intent of Congress that the Compact effectuated
an equitable, perpetual allocation between the Upper and Lower
Basins.
After finalization of the Compact, Carpenter emphasized the
perpetual nature of the allocation in urging ratification of the
Compact by the Colorado legislature, stating:
The apportionment to the upper territory is perpetual. It is

in no manner affected by subsequent development. It is not required
that the water shall be used within any prescribed period.

Broadly speaking, from a Colorado viewpoint, the compact
perpetually sets apart and withholds for the benefit of Colorado a

20. During the negotiation of the Compact, Carpenter stated with regard to a
proposed time limit on the Compact:
There is no impending disaster above. That country should develop
along its natural lines. It is to the welfare of the river that it should not
develop suddenly above, and it is to the welfare of the river that it should
develop suddenly below. Now, the span of time should be sufficient in the
growth of the Basin generally, so that each individual farmer, as well as each
individual project should be protected. Thus, each may start naturally, and
in such a way that when he does develop a new farm or a new project the
country will be ready and the returns from the production will be sufficient,
so that he may pay for the burden of the development.

...
That will serve to illustrate the reasons why upper development
will come gradually. The development will not be all at once. It will be
promoted by need.
Minutes, Fourteenth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Bishop's Lodge,
Santa Fe, NM. (Nov. 13, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation
Board).
Later in the negotiations, Carpenter stated, "[t]
he whole theory of the compact
is this: That the water apportioned to each basin is adequate not only for all of its
present uses, but for the increase of development within each basin." Minutes,
Twenty-fourth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Bishop's Lodge, Santa Fe,
N.M. (Nov. 23, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
21. See, e.g., Minutes, Sixth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Dep't of
Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Jan. 30, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation
Board); Fourteenth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, supra note 20; Twentyfourth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, supranote 20.

22. John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contrary Views of the Law of the Colorado
River: An Examination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower Basins, 32 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 21-1, 21-4 to 21-7 (1986).
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preferred right to utilize the waters of the river
within this State to the
23
extent of our present and future necessities.
Thus, the Compact renders a race for development between Upper
and Lower Basins unnecessary. The Compact assures the Upper Basin
that the Lower Basin's entitlement is only a finite share of the
Colorado River, thus allowing the Upper Basin to make long-term
capital investments with a degree of security in its water supply. The
Upper Basin is free to develop water as economic need dictates,
regardless of how long that might take. The Upper Basin is not
required to answer questions about the pace of its development, or,
more importantly, to undertake premature or environmentally
destructive water project development simply to hoard water for future
need against the Lower Basin. 5
B.

THE UPPER BASIN SOUGHT TO ELIMINATE THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIOR
APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE ON AN INTERSTATE BASIS

In addition to the enormous financial demand of large-scale
development, the need for coordination in the development of the
Colorado River also became apparent because of the slightly different
legal doctrines in each of the western states. Interstate disputes
highlighted these differences, and the assertion of federal authority
over interstate waters exacerbated them.
Early in the twentieth
century, Colorado litigated three lawsuits in the United States
Supreme Court involving interstate waters-Kansas v. Colorado I and
27
I,
and Wyoming v. Colorado.
The Kansas v. Colorado cases involved

23. Delph E. Carpenter, In Re Colorado River Compact, Report before the Governor
of Colorado, Oliver H. Shroup (Dec. 15, 1922), reprinted in SENATEJOuRNAL, 24th Gen.
Assembly, at 78-79 (Colo. 1923) [hereinafter Carpenter Report] (on file with the
Colorado Water Conservation Board).
24. In his inaugural address in January 1923, newly elected Governor William E.
Sweet agreed with the policy of his predecessor Oliver Shoup, supporting the
Compact:
Our present irrigated area in round numbers is about three and
one-half million acres. We must extend this area and thereby increase our
agricultural output and our rural population, thus building up our towns and
cities.

The Colorado River Compact... seems to effect a division that is
fair and at the same time gives to private and public capital that degree of
certainty necessary to investment in enterprises depending upon water supply
from that source.
Governor William E. Sweet, Inaugural Address (Jan. 9, 1923), reprinted in SENATE
JOURNAL, 24th Gen. Assembly, at 148-49 (Colo. 1923).
25. In fact, Article III(e) of the Compact expressly prohibits the hoarding of water,
providing that, "[t]he States of the Upper Division shall not withhold water, and the
States of the Lower Division shall not require the delivery of water, which can not
reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses." Compact, supranote 1, § 3761-101, art. III(e).
26. Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas I), 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas
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disputes between two states with different water law systems. Colorado
was a pure prior appropriation state, while Kansas water law, like
California law, employed a combination of riparian and prior
appropriation doctrines. Colorado asserted it had a sovereign right to
fully deplete the Arkansas River. 8 The Supreme Court held that
Kansas, as a downstream state, did not have the right to all of the water
in the Arkansas River undepleted by Colorado.9 However, the Court
also held that Colorado, as the state of origin, did not have the right to
retain all the water within its borders. 0 Therefore, the Court imposed
an equitable apportionment of water, without regard to the relative
dates of use within the two states.
In contrast, the decision in Wyoming v. Colorado involved two pure
prior appropriation states. In this case, the Court declined to apply
the Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment, and instead applied a rule
of interstate priority-between two prior appropriation states, the
doctrine of prior appropriation applies."' Thus, the result in the
Wyoming case became one of the principal motivating factors in
Colorado's desire to pursue the negotiation of the Compact. The
Upper Basin feared the Lower Basin could use the Wyoming decision to
obtain permanent preferential rights to water simply by developing
faster.3 In the Compact negotiations, Colorado sought to make sure
the states would never use the rule in the Wyoming case to deprive the
Upper Basin of its right of development.
The Upper Basin achieved its goal. Several provisions of the
Compact limit the Lower Basin's claim on Upper Basin water. The
first, of course, is the perpetual allocation of consumptive use made in
Article III(a). Regarding water flowing from the Upper to the Lower
Basin, Article III(e) provides that one cannot make a claim except to
the extent actually needed for domestic and agricultural purposes.
Article IV(b) makes power generation subservient to consumption for
domestic and agricultural purposes. Finally, Article VIII provides that
the Compact does not impair present perfected rights, and all other
rights are to be satisfied solely from water apportioned to the basin in
which they are situated.
After the Compact negotiations, Carpenter discussed his view of
the effect of the Wyoming case, and how the Compact had resolved the

II), 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
27. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
28. Kansas1, 185 U.S. at 143.
29. Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 117-18.
30. Id.
31. Wyoming, 259 U.S. at 470-71.
32. David H. Getches, Competing Demandsfor the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REv.
413, 420 (1985).
33. HUNDLEY, supra note 8, at 104. At one point in the Compact negotiations,
Herbert Hoover asked Carpenter, "I take it that you necessarily deny the whole theory
of priority of utilization as between states." Carpenter replied, "Emphatically."
Minutes, Seventh meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Dep't of Commerce, Wash.,
D.C. (Jan. 30, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
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issue.
Further development on the lower river will in no manner affect this
apportionment or impair the right of the upper States to consume
Any
their apportionment whenever their necessities require.
immense reservoir hereafter constructed on the lower river cannot be
the basis of a preferred claim which will interfere with the future
development of the Upper Basin. The development in the Lower
Basin will be confined to the apportionment made to that basin, with
the permissible increase. Any excess of development cannot infringe
upon the reservation perpetually set apart to the upper territory.
There can be no rivalry or contest of speed in the development of the
two basins. Priority of development in the Lower Basin will give no
preference of right as against the apportionment to the Upper
Basin.

C.

THE UPPER BASIN SOUGHT TO PRESERVE STATE AUTONOMY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OVER INTRASTATE WATER APPROPRIATION
AND ADMINISTRATION

For years, the West had seen far reaching claims of authority
asserted by the federal government over the use, allocation, and
development of western waters. One of the major purposes in
negotiating the Compact for the Upper Basin was to erect a shield
against federal claims of authority, thus preserving state regulatory
authority over allocation and administration of waters within state
borders.
One example of this federal incursion about which Carpenter was
concerned occurred pending the negotiation of the Root-Casasus
Treaty with Mexico in 1906. The Department of the Interior placed an
embargo on the construction of all water projects on public lands in
the Rio Grande Basin. The embargo lasted some thirty years,
preventing development in the Rio Grande Basin in Colorado.
Carpenter sensed a federal plot, stating, "[t]he real purpose was to
prevent any construction on the headwaters of the stream while
encouraging that construction along the lower river through which a
monopolistic claim could later be asserted."35 Carpenter asserted that

34. CarpenterReport, supra note 23, at 78. Some disagreement occurred in Colorado
about whether the Wyoming decision would even apply on the Colorado River.
Colorado attorney Ward Bannister believed that California and the interstate
application of the prior appropriation doctrine was not so much of a threat. He
stated:
Now, it is the contention of the people in our State, and I think of the
other upper States as well, that inasmuch as California has exactly the same
kind of water law as has Kansas-in other words, a State whose fundamental
water law is riparianism, with such appropriation rights as there are carved
out of previously existing riparian rights, that the rule to be applied to [the
Colorado River] would be exactly the same as the rule laid down in Kansas v.
Colorado for the Arkansas River.
REUEL LESUIE OLSON, THE COLORADO RrvER COMPACr 171 n.207 (1926) (citations
omitted); see also HUNDLEY, supra note 8, at 179-80.
35. Upper ColoradoRiver States: Hearings on Swing-Johnson Bill Before the House Comm.
on Irrigationand Reclamation, 67th Cong. 9 (1926) (statement of Delph E. Carpenter,
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after Wyoming had initiated the construction of the Pathfinder
Reservoir, a similar embargo occurred against development in the
headwaters of the North Platte Basin in Colorado.36
The United States also made direct assertions of broad legal
authority in the case of Kansas v. Colorado. Carpenter summarized,
"the United States intervened in the case urging that, by the
enactment of the [National Reclamation Act], Congress had adopted a
policy of national control and supervision over interstate streams,
which was to supersede state control, upon a rule of priority of
appropriation regardless of state lines."37
The United States had asserted a similar claim in a Colorado
proceeding for the adjudication of the water rights to the Grand Valley
project by local water users. Carpenter explained:
Government counsel appeared before the State Court and insisted
that the proposed project would occupy a preferred position
compared with other appropriators; that the United States and not
the states is the source of title to all water rights; that by the
enactment of the National Reclamation Act Congress had, by
implication, set apart and dedicated all of the then unappropriated
waters of western rivers for the primary purpose of ultimate diversion
by canals to be built under the National Reclamation Act and that all
rights of other appropriators and users must be subordinate to the
preferred right of the Government to divert as much water as it might
see fit under date of the approval of the National Reclamation Act.5°
The United States lost the Grand Valley case but continued to
assert plenary federal control in other forums. In Wyoming v. Colorado,
the federal government asserted claim to all the unappropriated water
in western streams and rivers. However, the Supreme Court found it
was not necessary to address the federal claims.
The federal
government also asserted appropriation claims in federal courts under
the theory state courts had no jurisdiction over them.
Even in the Compact negotiations, the United States made broad
claims of superceding authority. The relationship of state and federal
authority was one of the fundamental issues the Compact addressed.
Herbert Hoover explained the Constitutional interests of the United
States in his opening address to the Colorado River Commission
("Commission"), stating: "The Federal Government is interested
through its control of navigation, through protection of its treaty
obligations, through development of national irrigation projects and
through virtual control of power development depending upon the
use of public lands."3 9
Interstate River Comm'r for Colorado) [hereinafter Hearings]; see also, Tyler, supra
note 13, at 233.
36. Tyler, supranote 13, at 233-34.
37. Hearings,supra note 35, at 11.
38. Id,at 12-13.
39. Minutes, First meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Dep't of Commerce,
Wash., D.C. (Jan. 26, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
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The discussion of federal/state authority also arose directly toward
the end of the Compact negotiations, when Herbert Hoover raised
concerns about the issue of the retained authority of the federal
government then under discussion. Ottamer Hamele, Chief Counsel
of the Reclamation Service, urged that the Compact contain a general
reservation of rights by the federal government. Hamele asserted that
the Compact was in reality an agreement only among the states and
that failure to include a reservation of federal rights could jeopardize
the prospects for congressional ratification. When asked by Hoover
for an enumeration of the federal rights, Hamele responded:
Why the federal rights are first, the paramount right of
navigation, which affects flood control. The United States also has
the ownership, I believe, of all of the unappropriated water of the
Basin. It has an interest in the building of irrigation works under the
national irrigation act. It has rights under the Federal Water Power
Act that possibly don't conflict with anything in this compact, but
there are possibilities that we could conceive of by which that Act
could be amended so that those rights might become in conflict with
ights in
this compact unless they were reserved. It 40also has
h
connection with its treaties with the Indian tribes.
In view of his experience in resisting broad federal claims, it would
have been natural if Carpenter were upset with Hamele when Hamele
raised these same federal claims. Fortunately for Carpenter (and for
the prospects of an agreement), Hoover came to Carpenter's defense,
and affirmed the intent of the Compact with regard to the
preservation of states' rights. Hoover said to Hamele, "[w] ell, we have
provided here for an apportionment. That apportionment is not yet
appropriated. If the federal government should intervene and say that
the unappropriated water was its possession and province, it would
destroy this entire apportionment between the seven states.
Ultimately, the Compact did address several of the specific federal
powers the Commissioners had discussed. The Compact made explicit
in Article VIII that it did not affect vested water rights. Article III(a)
and (b) specifically apportioned to the states the right to
consumptively use unappropriated water, thus affirming state
ownership of that water. That ownership was subject to the reserved
authority of the United States to enter into a treaty with Mexico, and
the Compact specified in Article III(c) the waters that the United
States could use to satisfy any such obligation. While Article VII
specifically left the question of quantification of Indian reserved water
rights for future resolution, the Compact appears to charge the use of
reserved rights against the basin in which the use is made. Article IV
acknowledged that the Colorado River was not navigable-in-fact and

40. Minutes, Twenty-second meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Bishop's
Lodge, Santa Fe, N.M. (Nov. 22, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation
Board).
41.

Id
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made uses for navigation subservient to domestic, agriculture, and
power purposes (but reserved the authority of Congress to disapprove
of this paragraph).
The Upper Basin asserted the Compact preserved the autonomy of
the states to regulate and allocate water under their own state systems.
After finalization of the Compact, Carpenter addressed the Compact's
intent to preserve intrastate regulation of water through the prior
appropriation doctrine.
Intrastate control of appropriations made within the apportionments
provided by the compact is specifically reserved by paragraph (c)
Article IV. This includes such regulations as each state may provide

by its constitution and laws respecting the preference of one class of
use over other classes of use. In other words the constitution and

laws of Colorado control the details of appropriation, use and
distribution of water within the state. The compact does not attempt
to invade such matters of local concern. When approved, the
compact. will be the law of the river as between the states. It deals

whofly with interstate relations. This paragraph refers to intrastate
control. Whatever the intrastate regulation and control may be it
cannot effect the interstate relations. No law of any state can have
extraterritorial effect 42or interfere with the operation of the compact
as between the states.
After the Compact negotiations, in his testimony on the SwingJohnson Bill (later enacted as the Boulder Canyon Project Act of
1928), Carpenter asserted that part of the movement to negotiate the
Compact had evolved from the desire to preserve state autonomy.
Before the Compact, the Upper Basin States saw the Boulder Canyon
dam proposal as a "monopolistic structure[] proposed for lower river
protection. "4
Carpenter summarized the Upper Basin States'
opposition to authorization of the lower basin reservoir without
simultaneous ratification of the Compact.
The upper states have done everything within their power to
speedily solve the underlying legal problems involved in the
construction of flood control works for the lower river territory. They

insist that thej be afforded the protection of the Colorado River
Compact, pre erably by all seven states, before any further claims
attach to the fiver.

42.

Delph E.Carpenter, In Re Colorado River Compact, Supplemental Report (Mar. 20,

1923), reprinted in SENATE JOURNAL, 24th Gen. Assembly, at 891 (Colo. 1923)
[hereinafter Supplemental Report]. The United States Supreme Court later upheld this
theory of interstate allocation versus intrastate regulatory control. See Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). However, as held in
Hinderlider, the Compact effectuated a legislative equitable apportionment, and
therefore set a limit on the authority of the states to vest rights to use water in excess of
its limits, and also vested each state with the authority to enforce its terms. Id. at 103,
106-11.
43. Hearings,supranote 35, at 22.
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They are not willing to permit their territory to be burdened

and their people to be harassed [sic] with any such conditions as have
prevailed upon the Rio Grande, North Platte and other rivers. In
necessary self defense they must resist the construction of any
reservoir upon the lower river until their rights have been settled by
compact.
In authorizing the construction of Hoover Dam and consenting to
the Compact, Congress affirmed the concept of state autonomy in
intrastate allocation and administration. When Congress passed the
Boulder Canyon Project Act 45 in 1928, it contained no general federal
reservation of rights. The Act subjected the rights of the United States
in or to waters of the Colorado River to the provisions of the
Compact.46 It gave the states an official advisory role, with full access to
records, in the activities of the Secretary of the Interior under the
Act." Finally, the Act specifically disclaimed any interference with the
rights of the states to adopt laws and policies concerning the
subject
appropriation, control, and use of waters within their borders,
48
only to the Colorado River Compact or other compacts.
D.

THE UPPER BASIN SOUGHT TO AVOID THE THREAT OF INTERSTATE
LITIGATION AMONG THE STATES AND BETWEEN THE STATES
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

At the opening meeting of the Commission, Hoover stressed that
avoiding litigation was one of the primary purposes of the Compact.
It is hoped that such an agreement may be arrived at by this
Commission as will prevent endless litigation which will inevitably
arise in the conflict of state rights, with the delays and costs that will
be imposed upon our citizens through such conflicts. The success of
its efforts will contribute to the welfare of millions of people.
Carpenter responded to Hoover:
As you well observed in your opening address the prime object of the
creation of this Commission was to avoid future litigation among the
states interested in the Colorado River and the utilization of the
benefits to be obtained from its water supply.'s

Carpenter had experience in the vagaries of interstate Supreme

44.
45.
U.S.C.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 25.
Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as amended at 43
§ 617 (1994)).
43 U.S.C. §§ 6171 (b)-(d), 617m (1994).
Id. § 617o.
Id. § 617q.
First meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, supra note 39.
Id.
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Court litigation and a fear of federal intrusion."
He saw the
mechanism of an interstate compact as a way to settle differences and
avoid protracted and expensive litigation, both among the states, and
between the states and the federal government." Carpenter stated the
following:
A suit between the States is but a substitute for war. It is the

last resort, and should not be resorted to until all avenues of

settlement by compact have been exhausted. It has been suggested
that the Supreme Court should announce the principle that no suit
between the States would be entertained without a preliminary
showing that reasonable efforts had been made by the complaining
State to compose the differences between il and the defendant State
by mutual agreement or interstate compact.

Carpenter also stated:
The Colorado River Compact was conceived and concluded
for the purpose of p reserving the autonomy of the states, of defining
the respective jurisdictions of the states and of the United States and

of assuring the peace and future prosperity of an immense part of our
national territory. With it there will be no overriding of state
authority by national agencies. Otherwise, interstate and statenational conflict,
strife, rivalry and interminable litigation will be
54
inevitable.

Article I of the Compact does, in fact, include as part of its purposes,
"to promote interstate comity" and "to remove causes of present and
future controversies.' 55
E.

THE UPPER BASIN SOUGHT TO CREATE A FOUNDATION FOR THE
COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF
THE COLORADO RIVER

California's primary motivation in entering compact negotiations
was the prospect of gaining political support for construction of the
All-American Canal and a large reservoir on the lower Colorado River
to control floods, generate power, and regulate water supply.
However, all of the Commissioners were aware of the wildly fluctuating
nature of the Colorado River flow, and the need for comprehensive
reservoir development to achieve security in any allocation among the
states. In his opening remarks to the Commission at its first meeting,
Hoover said:
The problem is not as simple as might appear on the surface
for while there is possibly ample water in the river for all purposes if
51. See supra Section I.B.-C.
52. Tyler, supra note 13, at 241.
53.
54.

HistoricalMemorandum, supra note 18.
Hearings,supra note 35, at 2.

55. Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art. I.
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adequate storage be undertaken, there is not a sufficient supply of
water to meet all claims unless there is some definite program of
water conservation.

[I] t may develop in the course of our inquiry that there is
a deficiency of water in the Colorado River unless we assume
adequate storage. There may be a surplus if storage is provided.
Therefore, the solution of the whole problem may well be contingent
on storage.

It would seem to me that it would be a great misfortune if we
did not give to Congress and to the country a 6broad project for
development of the Colorado River as a whole .... 5
Later in the negotiations, at the thirteenth through sixteenth
meetings, the negotiators reached the heart of the issues in dividing
the waters. They discussed how much water to allocate each basin,
what types of delivery guarantee the Upper Basin should make, and
over what period to measure the delivery obligation.
Ferry. 7
The first agreement reached was the measuring point-Lee
The Commissioners then
Carpenter proposed that
obligation over a period of
Upper Basin would be a
obligation. He stated:

turned to the concept of averaging.
the Upper Basin average its delivery
ten years, recognizing that storage in the
necessary prerequisite to meeting that

[A] consideration of the stream flow tables... indicates that a ten
year period gave a fair and reasonably accurate average of the flow of
the river, taking both high and low cycles, and that a ten year period
would reach into both cycles and largely include them, and that as
the future development in both the upper and the lower basin must
rely upon storage, the storage facilities would care for that rise and
fall

[A] ny student of the river must realize that the future development in
both areas will be that predicated upon the construction of reservoirs.
Nevertheless, we have no power to say by whom these reservoirs shall
be constructed, in what localities or when they shall be constructed.
That should be left free to both communities to use such
instrumentalities as may be at hand, and the division of the water

56. First meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, supra note 39.
57. Delph Carpenter is credited with originating the "fifty-fifty plan" of dividing the
River into two sub-basins and apportioning the water between them. Tyler, supra note
13, at 243.
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should be so made that either area may build, or neglect to build, of
its own notion, and as it may believe construction or lack of
construction is at any one time justified.

In truth, the best possible safeguard for the lower states to insure a
delivery at Lee's Ferry within reasonable inclusive figures from year to
year would be tle immediate development of the reservoir storage of
the upper area.
Ultimately, of course, the Commissioners arrived at a delivery
obligation by the Upper Basin predicated on a ten-year running
average and not contemplated on a one-year minimum delivery
obligation.
Clearly, the basis for this understanding was the
assumption that Congress would approve, at some point, the
comprehensive development of regulatory storage throughout the
entire basin. Congress did lay this foundation for such development in
the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act.
I. THE 1928 BOULDER CANYON PROJECT ACT
After the representatives of the states and the federal government
negotiated the Compact, the Compact needed each of the States'
ratification and Congress's consent. State ratification proved to be a
challenging undertaking. By 1928, when Congress passed the Boulder
Canyon Project Act,59 only four of the seven states had ratified the
Compact.6 Arizona was particularly adamant in its opposition to the
Compact and refused to ratify. To bypass recalcitrant Arizona, the
effectiveness of the Boulder Canyon Project Act was contingent upon
California limiting itself to total water consumption from the Colorado
River of 4.4 million acre-feet per year ("m.a.f./yr"), and upon
ratification of the Compact by any six states, including California."'

California almost immediately passed the California Limitation Act6
and ratified the Compact. Ratification by Utah followed, and the
Boulder Canyon Project Act became effective.63 Soon after, in the
1931 California Seven-Party Agreement," the major California entities
agreed among themselves on the priorities within California.
58. Minutes, Thirteenth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Bishop's Lodge,
Santa Fe, N.M. (Nov. 13, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
59. Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 617 (1994)).
60. HuNDLEY, supra note 8, at 276.
61. 43 U.S.C. § 617c(a) (1994). As with other major ideas in the settlement of
major issues on the Colorado River, Delph Carpenter is credited with the "Six-State
Plan" for ratification of the Compact that Congress adopted in the Boulder Canyon
Project Act. Tyler, supranote 13, at 259.
62. Act of Aug. 14, 1929, 1929 Cal. Stat. 38. Under this Act, the state of California
irrevocably and unconditionally, and as a covenant for the benefit of the other Basin
States, limited its use of Colorado River water to 4.4 m.a.f./yr.
63. HUNDLEY, supra note 8, at 281.
64. See discussion infraSection IV.
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After the Compact negotiation, and pending state ratification and
congressional consent, discussions arose over who would build and pay
for the monumental works contemplated by the states. Possible
candidates included the federal government, irrigators, power
customers, or private entities. Additionally, the states worried about
their respective jurisdictional responsibilities and the authority of the
Federal Power Commission if a private entity constructed a major dam.
This debate did serve to make one fact perfectly clear: the construction
and operation of any major facility on the Colorado River was too big,
and the international and interstate issues too complex, for anyone
other than the federal government to undertake. 65
The federal government did undertake this responsibility in 1928,
when the Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized the construction of
the Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal. As the states would later
see in the United States Supreme Court decision in Arizona v.
6 6 the Boulder Canyon Project Act also represented a major
California,
step by Congress in the imposition of federal authority (albeit with the
consent of and in coordination with the states), in the allocation,
regulation, and management of the Colorado River.
The Upper Basin interests also pursued their idea of
comprehensive storage development. They secured in the 1928
Boulder Canyon Project Act a provision authorizing the Secretary of
the Interior to study and report to Congress, on a comprehensive and
coordinated basis, the potential development of water projects
throughout the Basin.67
The Depression and World War II delayed the comprehensive
study authorized in 1928. Once completed in 1946, the study
maintained the theme that one could not accomplish coordinated
storage on or management of the Colorado River without first
securing interstate allocations. The study recommended that the
Upper Basin States divide the waters among themselves through their
own interstate compact, so as to allow this development to occur."'
IV. THE 1931 CALIFORNIA SEVEN-PARTY AGREEMENT
Although the Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized the Secretary
of the Interior ("Secretary") to allocate water by contract among water
users in the Lower Basin, the Secretary requested that California water
users provide him with recommendations regarding how to make the
The Seven-Party Agreement
allocation within California.
("Agreement"), between the major water agencies in California, made
that intrastate apportionment. The Agreement allocated the first 3.85
m.a.f. of water delivered to California to agricultural uses in the
Imperial, Coachella, and Palo Verde areas, and to the Yuma Project of
65. Id. at 113-37.
66. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
67. Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, § 15, 45 Stat. 1065 (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. § 617n (1994)).
68. Carlson & Boles, supranote 22, at 21-7 to 21-9.
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the Bureau of Reclamation.

The Agreement allocated t2

priorities, totaling 1.212 m.a.f., to the Metropolitan Watei
Southern California. 9 The Agreement allocated subsequei
to agricultural agencies. The priorities, and the agenci
them, are important to a clear understanding of current iss
to California's use of water. Table I shows the allocation
made by the Agreement.

TABLE I: CALFORNIA SEVEN-PARTY AGREEMENT PR
PRIORITY

DESCRIPTION

A
_A

1

Palo Verde Irrigation District 104,500 acres

2

Yuma Project (Reservation Division) -

3(a)

gross area of

not

exceeding a gross area of 25,000 acres
Imperial Irrigation District and lands in
Imperial and Coachella Valleys to be served by
the All-American Canal

3(b)

Palo Verde Irrigation District of mesa lands

4

Metropolitan Water District and/or City of Los

16,000 acres

Angeles and/or others on coastal plain

5(a)

Metropolitan Water District and/or City of Los
Angeles and/or others on coastal plain

5(b)

City and/or County of San Diego"

6(a)

Imperial Irrigation District and
Imperial and Coachella Valley

6(b)

Palo Verde Irrigation District -

lands in

16,000 acres

of mesa lands

7

Agricultural Use in the Colorado River Basin
in California

TOTAL

69. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (which is

"Metropolitan," "Met," or "MWD"), supplies wholesale water to membc
the Southern California Coastal Plain, from Ventura County to San Dieg(
70. In 1946, the City of San Diego, San Diego County Wat
Metropolitan Water District, and the Secretary of the Interior entered i
in which the right to storage and delivery of Colorado River water vested
San Diego and was merged with and added to the rights of the Metro]
District under conditions since satisfied.
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There are two important points to note concerning these
allocations under the Agreement. First, the Agreement allocated more
than California's basic apportionment of 4.4 m.a.f./yr under the
Boulder Canyon Project Act. Thus, the agreement also allocated
interruptible surplus water. It just so happens that the entity most in
need of a secure water supply, the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California ("Metropolitan"), has the right to divert 550,000
acre-feet within the 4.4 m.a.f. limitation, and 662,000 acre-feet above
the limitation. Metropolitan's diversion facility from the Colorado
River-the Colorado River Aqueduct-has a capacity of about 1.3
m.a.f./yr. Therefore, any limitation that may be imposed on overall
use in California to 4.4 m.a.f./yr will limit Metropolitan to a diversion
of less than one-half of the capacity of its conveyance facility.
Second, the Agreement provides no cap or quantification of use
within the priorities allocated to the agricultural districts entitled to
divert the first 3.85 m.a.f. of California's allocation. Acreage (104,500
acres) limits the first priority, held by the Palo Verde Irrigation
District, not any quantity of water. The Agreement gives the second
priority, held by the Reservation Division of the Yuma Project,
whatever amount of water it may need to irrigate 25,000 acres. Even
more problematic, the Imperial Irrigation District, the Coachella
Valley Water District, and 16,000 acres of land on the Lower Mesa in
the Palo Verde Valley share the third priority, with no allocation or
quantification of rights between them, other than the 1934
Compromise Agreement that gives the Imperial District first call on
third priority water.
These matters have become quite significant in the discussions
among the Basin States and within California over the last several years
on the development of a California Plan to implement measures to
limit California's use to 4.4 m.a.f./yr. As we will see in Part II of this
article, the problem of Metropolitan's priority and capacity over and
above California's basic apportionment, and the lack of defined
quantification in the Agreement, are two of the major issues that
California must resolve to eventually live within its means as provided
in the Law of the River.
V. THE MEXICAN WATER TREATY OF 1944
The Mexican Water Treaty of 1944" ("Treaty") is critical to a
complete understanding of the Law of the River. In years to come,
issues surrounding the environmental and urban demands in the
Colorado River Delta and Mexicali Valley will become increasingly
important. However, the importance of the Treaty for the purpose of
this article is its requirement that the United States guarantee delivery
of 1.5 m.a.f./yr to Mexico, plus up to an additional 200,000 acre-feet, if
the Secretary of the Interior determines that surplus water is

71.

Mexican Water Treaty, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219.
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available.'
The Treaty made this allocation a "first call" on the
Colorado River.
In granting an element of certainty to Colorado River allocation,
the Mexican delivery obligation also injected new issues into the
relationship between the Upper and Lower Basins, which remain
unresolved." These issues, along with the growing concern about the
condition of the environment in the Delta area, underscore the Upper
Basin's agitation with California's continued reliance on surplus water
in excess of its basic apportionment. If, as a result of the California
Plan discussed in Part II of this article, California is able to implement
measures to reduce its dependence on surplus water, then the states
would improve their ability to take a positive role in resolving some of
these new emerging issues. On the other hand, if the allocation
framework of the Law of the River is undermined, the states will need
to take a much more conservative approach.
VI. THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMPACT
As the 1946 Department of the Interior study suggested, the Upper
Basin states reached an agreement in 1948 allocating water
consumption rights under the Compact." One problem for the Upper
Division states was how to handle the "leftovers" from the Upper Basin
supply after it had met its obligation under Article III(d) not to
deplete the flow of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry below 75 m.a.f.
every ten years. 75 As a solution, Article III(a) (2) of the Upper
Colorado River Compact divided the consumptive use of water allotted
to the Upper Basin on a percentage basis: Colorado-51.75%; New
Mexico-11.25%; 7 Utah-23.00%; Wyoming-14.00%; and Arizona50,000 acre-feet. 6
The Upper Colorado River Compact also created the Upper
Colorado River Basin Commission, a compact commission that
continues to provide a valuable forum for the Upper Division states.
The Upper Colorado River Basin Commission allows states to
formulate positions, gather data and information, and advocate
positions on federal legislation. Furthermore, this forum allows
member states to develop operating strategies relative to federal
reservoirs on the Colorado River, Mexican Treaty issues, and water
supply and development issues in the Lower Basin.

72. As discussed below, with respect to the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act
and the Operating Criteria, supra note 4, this surplus is not the same as a surplus
determined under that Act and the Decree in Arizona v. California.
73. For a discussion of the major issues surrounding the Compact and the Treaty,
see Getches, supra note 32, at 421-23.
74. Upper Colorado River Compact, 63 Stat. 31, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-62-101 to
-106 (2000) [hereinafter Upper Colorado River Compact].
75. Getches, supra note 32, at 420.
76. Upper Colorado River Compact, supra note 74, § 37-62-101 (because of the
small magnitude of use in Arizona, its share was made definite).
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VII. ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA
During this same period, Arizona pressed Congress for
construction of the Central Arizona Project ("Project"). However,
Lower Division States had not agreed upon a compact. This,
combined with disagreement between Arizona and California as to the
meaning and effect of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, made water
supplies for the Project uncertain. In 1952, Arizona sued California to
obtain ajudicial determination providing such certainty.77
At stake in the lawsuit was the 1.0 m.a.f. of water referenced in
Article III(b) of the Compact. Arizona argued the Project had
allocated 7.5 m.a.f. of water from only the mainstem Colorado River,
limiting California to 4.4 m.a.f. of this amount. California argued the
allocation included Lower Basin tributaries, and therefore, the Court
should equitably apportion mainstem waters in excess of 7.5 m.a.f. to
California. In 1963, the Court ruled in favor of Arizona, holding
Congress had enacted a "complete statutory apportionment" of only
mainstem Colorado River water. 78 The Boulder Canyon Project Act
does not explicitly make such an apportionment. However, the Court
found an implied apportionment based on congressional intent and
the Act's delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Interior to
allocate and distribute water through contracts.
The Court emphasized the Secretary's discretion in making an
initial contract allocation, further noting that the Lower Basin often
refers to the Secretary as the "water master." However, the Court also
emphasized the "significant limitations" on the Secretary's discretion
once he makes that contractual allocation. The Court noted that the
Act limits the purposes for storing and releasing water.8 0 The Act
makes all contracts permanent, 8 ' and limits the revenues generated
from those contracts. 2 The Secretary, and all permittees, licensees,
and contractees, are subject to the Compact," "and therefore can do
nothing to upset or encroach upon the Compact's allocation of4
Basins."1
Colorado River water between the Upper and Lower
Furthermore, the Act requires the Secretary to satisfy present
The only real Secretarial operational discretion
perfected rights."
recognized by the Court is in the apportionment of shortages.8
One year after its decision, the Court entered its Decree. 7 The

77. See FelixJ. Sparks, Article Update, Synopsis of MajorDocuments and Events Relating
to the ColoradoRiver, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 339, 349-54 (2000).
78. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 560 (1963).
79. Id. at 584.
80. 43 U.S.C. § 617e (1994).
81. Id. § 617d.
82. Id. §617c(b).
83. Id. § 617g(a).
84. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 584 (1963).
85. 43 U.S.C. § 617e (1994).
86. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 592-94.
87. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
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Decree, as an injunction, enforced the largely non-discretionary nature
of the Secretary's operational authority. The Decree characterized all
water below Lee Ferry and in the United States, as "Water Controlled
by the United States," and enjoined the Secretary to distribute such
water strictly in accordance with its terms. The Decree required the
Secretary to release water only pursuant to valid contracts with water
users,8 and only under three circumstances: normal, 9 surplus, 9° and
shortage." The Decree also required the Secretary to charge any
consumptive use of water to the state in which it is used,92 and allowed
the Secretary the authority to make unused water in one state available
for use in another state, on a temporary basis. 9
VIII. THE 1956 COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT ACT
The Compact negotiators understood that comprehensive storage
development would be necessary to even out the wild fluctuations in
Colorado River flow and assure each Basin the security of water
supplies necessary to reach their envisioned potential development.
The Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized the Department of the
Interior to study development of such a system, which the Department
completed in 1946. Following the 1948 Upper Basin Compact, the
Upper Basin States looked to the federal government for the
development of a comprehensive river management system. Their
plan consisted of the federal government paying to construct a series
of reservoirs that would create a "bank account" of stored water to
assure that the Upper Basin could meet its Article III(d) delivery
obligation under the Compact, and thus allow each state to develop its
entitlement to water in the Colorado River System.
In response, the federal government enacted the 1956 Colorado
River Storage Project Ace 4 ("1956 Act"). The 1956 Act authorized the
construction of the Curecanti Unit, Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and Glen
88. Id. at 343 (Article II(B)(5)).
89. Under Article 11(B) (1) of the Decree, if the Secretary determines sufficient
mainstem water is available to satisfy 7.5 m.a.f. of annual consumptive use in the Lower
Division States, he shall make available 4.4 m.a.f. to California, 2.8 m.a.f. to Arizona,
and 0.3 m.a.f. to Nevada. Id. at 342.
90. Under Article II(B)(2) of the Decree, if the Secretary determines sufficient
mainstem water is available to satisfy the annual consumptive use in the Lower Division
States in excess of 7.5 m.a.f., the surplus consumptive use is apportioned fifty-fifty to
Arizona and California, except if the United States contracts with Nevada, in which
case the surplus is apportioned 50% to California, 46% to Arizona, and 4% to Nevada.
Id.
91. Under Article II(B)(3) of the Decree, if the Secretary determines insufficient
mainstem water is available to satisfy 7.5 m.a.f. of annual consumptive use in the Lower
Division States, he is authorized to apportion such shortage pursuant to the Boulder

Canyon Project Act only after satisfying all present perfected rights in order of their
priority dates and after consultation with parties to major delivery contracts. Id. at

342-43.
92. Id. at 343 (Article II(B)(4)).
93. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 343 (1964) (Article 11(B) (6)).
94. Colorado River Storage Project Act, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620o (1994)).
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Canyon Dams, the so-called "holdover reservoirs," to store and release
water to the Lower Basin in satisfaction of the requirements of Article
III(d) of the Compact. These reservoirs allow the Upper Division
States to develop their Colorado River entitlements fully, without the
Lower Division States subjecting them to a "Compact Call."95 The 1956
Act also authorized, subject to subsequent appropriation, several
"participating projects," designed to satisfy more regional consumptive
use demands, mostly irrigation. However, the government did not
build many of these authorized participating projects because of
environmental and financial feasibility problems. The 1956 Act also
developed the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund, which credits power
revenues generated from the facilities. A portion of this credit goes
against costs of project repayment for irrigation components
authorized by Congress.
IX. THE 1968 COLORADO RIVER BASIN PROJECT ACT
In 1968, Congress and the states further solidified the coordinated
interstate operation of various facilities through the adoption of the
Colorado River Basin Project Ace 7 ("1968 Act"). The 1968 Act
assumed as a "national obligation" the provision of water to Mexico
under the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty. 9 The 1968 Act also authorized
the construction of the Central Arizona Project, but at a heavy price to
Arizona. The 1968 Act gave first priority in the Lower Basin to
California, requiring the Secretary of the Interior, in administrating
any shortages among the Lower Division States, to limit diversions
from the Colorado River for the Central Arizona Project to assure the
availability of a total of 4.4 m.a.f. of mainstream water for use in
California." In exchange for authorization of the Central Arizona
Project, the 1968 Act directed the Secretary "to proceed as nearly as
practicable with the construction" of certain participating projects
authorized under the 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act,100 thus
the construction would not start later than the date of the first delivery
of water from the Central Arizona Project. 0 ' Although the Central
Arizona Project is now on line, the government did not build these
participating projects.'

95. H.R REP. No. 84-1087, pt.1, at 3 (1956), reprinted in1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346,
2348; see also, Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d
325, 334 (Colo. 2000).
96. 43 U.S.C. § 620d(a)-(e) (1994).
97. Colorado River Basin Project Act, 82 Stat. 886 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556 (1994)).
98. Id. § 1512.
99. Id. § 1521(b).
100. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
101. Id. § 620a-1; see also, Sparks, supra note 77, at 354-55.
102. These authorized but unbuilt projects include the West Divide, Fruitland Mesa,
Savory Pothook, and San Miguel Projects. The Animas-La Plata Project, a central
component of the Ute Indian water rights settlement, may yet be built, albeit in a
substantially reduced form.
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Finally, the 1968 Act gave several directives to the Secretary for the
coordinated operation of several federal reservoirs on the Colorado
River. The 1968 Act directs the Secretary to prepare a "consumptive
uses and losses report" every five years, which accounts for beneficial
consumptive uses on a state-by-state basis.' The 1968 Act also requires
the Secretary to propose criteria for the coordinated long-range
operation of specified federal reservoirs in both the Upper and Lower
Basins (principally Lakes Mead and Powell), to review those criteria
every five years, and to report annually on the actual operations under
the criteria for the preceding year and the projected operation for the
upcoming year.'
This latter report is known as the "Annual
Operating Plan."
With respect to Upper Basin reservoirs, the 1968 Act directs the
Secretary, through the criteria, to store water in storage units of the
Colorado River Storage Projectl'°and release water from Lake Powell in
16
furtherance of the Upper Basin's obligations under the Compact.
First, if the deficiency is chargeable to the Upper Basin, the Secretary
releases water from Lake Powell to supply one-half of any deficiency in
delivery to Mexico under Article III(c) of the Compact.' Second, the
Secretary releases water from Lake Powell in order to meet the Upper
Basin delivery requirement set forth in Article III(d) of the Compact75 m.a.f. every ten years.' 8 Third, the Secretary determines annually if
the amount of water in storage units of the Colorado River Storage
Project is less than or more than what is necessary to meet the abovereferenced delivery obligations, without impairing consumptive uses in
the Upper Basin under the Compact-in other words, without
potentially subjecting the Upper Basin to a "Compact Call."'09 The
government refers to this amount as "602 (a) storage.'
The Secretary
releases any amount of water in excess of 602(a) storage from Lake
Powell for the following purposes: (1) to the extent it can be
reasonably applied to beneficial use in the Lower Basin;"' (2) to
maintain, as nearly as practicable, an equal amount of storage
"a in Lakes
Mead and Powell;' 2 and (3) to avoid spills from Lake Powell. 1
In 1970, pursuant to the 1968 Act, the Secretary promulgated the
103. 43 U.S.C. § 1551(b)(1) (1994).
104. Id. § 1552(a)-(b).
105. The Colorado River Project units include the Curecanti Unit, and Flaming
Gorge, Navajo, and Glen Canyon Dams.
106. 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1994).
107. Id. § 1552(a)(1).
108. Id. § 1552(a) (2).
109. Id. § 1552(a) (3).
110. See OperatingCriteria,supra note 4, at 8951, art. 11(1).
111. 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(3). This clause of the statute implements Article 111(e) of
the Compact, which requires that "[t]he States of the Upper Division shall not
withhold water, and the States of the Lower Division shall not require the delivery of
water, which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses."
Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art. 111(e).
112. This release is referred to as "equalization."
113. 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(3) (1994).
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Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River
Reservoirs ("Operating Criteria")." 4 The Operating Criteria address
the units of the Colorado River Storage Project in the Upper Basin,
and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin. In broad outline, the Operating
Criteria require the Secretary to make several determinations in the
Annual Operating Plan to guide operations of system reservoirs for the
upcoming year. In the Upper Basin, the important determinations
relate to the amount of water that the Secretary will store in and
release from Lake Powell in that year, under the requirements
established in Section 602(a) of the 1968 Act.
For the most part, the Operating Criteria simply repeat the
mandates of Section 602(a). In one area, the Operating Criteria
expand upon those requirements. The Operating Criteria provide
that if the forecasted amount of storage in the Upper Basin is less than
602 (a) storage, or if the storage forecast for Lake Powell is less than
Lake Mead, the Secretary will maintain an "objective" to release a
The government
minimum of 8.23 m.a.f. in the upcoming year.
arrived at this amount ostensibly by taking the average Upper Basin
Compact delivery requirement of 7.5 m.a.f., subtracting tributary
inflows below Glen Canyon Dam and above Lee Ferry (about 20,000
acre-feet), and adding one-half of the United States' delivery
obligations under the 1944 Mexican Treaty (750,000 acre-feet).
This calculation is obviously a matter of convenience, pending
greater development in the Upper Basin, is not an interpretation of
the Compact, and has no basis in the law, for two reasons. First, the
only obligation of the Upper Division States under Article III(d) of the
Compact is to assure that they do not deplete the flow of the Colorado
River at 116Lee Ferry below 75 m.a.f. every ten years, on a running
This obligation imposes no burden or limitation on the
average.
Upper Basin to make any minimum delivery in any one year (except
possibly at the end of a ten-year sequence) and the Operating Criteria
cannot override the Compact. Second, the Upper Division States
disagree that they have any obligation to contribute half of the
Mexican Treaty delivery." 7 Therefore, the Upper Division States have
objected to any assertion by the Secretary that an actual annual
minimum release from Lake Powell may be enforced. They assert that
the 8.23 m.a.f. release is, as stated in the Criteria, an "objective" that
must be overridden by the terms of the Compact and the ultimate
determination of any Upper Basin obligations under the Mexican
Treaty."'
114. OperatingCriteria,supra note 4.
115. Id. at 8951, art. 11(2).
116. Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art. III(d).
117. See Getches, supra note 32, at 421-23.
118. Resolution by the Upper Colorado River Comm'n, Criteria for Coordinated
Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs (Feb. 27, 1971). See also Article
11(5) of the Operating Criteria, which states that the Operating Criteria "shall not
prejudice the position of either the upper or lower basin interests with respect to
required deliveries at Lee Ferry pursuant to the Colorado River Compact." Operating
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In operating Lake Mead under the Operating Criteria, the
Secretary makes determinations based on a number of factors, largely
repeated from the Decree in Arizona v. California."9 In a "Normal
Year," annual pumping and release from Lake Mead will be sufficient
to satisfy 7.5 m.a.f. of annual consumptive use in accordance with the
Decree.
In a "Surplus Year" (when the Secretary determines that
water in quantities greater than "normal" is available), the Secretary
apportions 50% of the surplus water to California, 46% to Arizona,
and 4% to Nevada, as outlined in the Decree.2 ' If the Secretary
determines a "Shortage" (water in quantities less than "normal" is
available), uses are restricted in accordance with the Decree and the
1968 Act.'
X. SOME MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE UPPER BASIN UNDER THE
LAW OF THE RIVER
States, the United States, Indian Tribes, and water user
organizations have exerted tremendous effort to establish a legal
framework for determining rights to use and develop the waters of the
Colorado River and to regulate its operation. Despite this effort,
however, significant issues exist that threaten to undermine the
security and certainty of supply created by that framework. The
balance of Part I of this article will discuss some of these issues, which
play into the relationships between the Upper Basin States and
California. The first issue regards the basic misunderstanding the
Compact negotiators had concerning how much water was actually in
the Colorado River System. The second issue relates to fundamental
unresolved matters the negotiators left to future generations. The
third issue stems from the fact that millions more people live in the
Basin, and the regulatory environment and public values of today are
considerably different and more complex than in 1922. Finally, some
have argued that market mechanisms and water transfers should be
allowed on an Upper to Lower Basin basis, to satisfy the increasing

Criteria, supra note 4, at 8951; Letter from Gerald R. Zimmerman, Executive Director
of the Upper Colorado River Comm'n, to Donald Paul Hodel, Secretary, Dep't of the
Interior (Jan. 16, 1986) (on file with author); Comments and Recommendations of
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming on the Secretary of the Interior's
December 16, 1969 Proposed Long-Range Operating Criteria for Colorado River
Reservoirs (Mar. 26, 1970) (on file with author).
119. See OperatingCriteria,supra note 4, at 8951-52, art. 111(3) (a)-(b).
120. See id. at 8951, art. III(3) (a).
121. It is important to note that "surplus" as used in the Operating Criteria is not
the same as the term "surplus" as used in Article 111(c) of the Compact, which refers to
United States' obligations to Mexico being supplied from waters surplus to those
apportioned under the Compact. See id. at 8952, art. IV(1) (b). See also David E.
Lindgren, The Colorado River: Are New Approaches Possible Now that the Reality of
Overallocationis Here, 38 Rocxy'MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 25-18 to 25-19 (1992).
122. See 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (1994). In section 1521(b) of the Colorado River Basin
Project Act, Arizona lost what it had gained in Arizona v. California. Section 1521(b)
provides that in times of shortage, diversions through the Central Arizona Project shall
be limited to the extent necessary to supply total uses in California of 4.4 m.a.f.
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demands in California and Nevada.
A. THE COMPACT NEGOTIATORS OVER-ESTIMATED WATER SUPPLY
It is impossible to negotiate any agreement, much less an interstate
compact making a perpetual allocation of water, and anticipate every
contingency. The Compact negotiators affirmatively put off some
issues, such as Indian reserved water rights and the obligation to
Mexico. However, the biggest variable was water supply, and it was an
issue about which the Compact negotiators were simply mistaken.
The negotiators had some idea of the water supply in the Colorado
River System, and calculated uses based on the consumptive use of
irrigation. However, the negotiators dealt with an extremely limited
period of record. Moreover, the years prior to 1922 were actually
abundant water years. The negotiators made various estimates of
water supply in the mainstream, which ranged from 18 to 21 m.a.f./yr.
The significance of these discussions over water supply is evident
from the Upper Basin's obligation not to deplete the Colorado River
below a ten-year running average of 75 m.a.f. The Upper Basin
negotiators were comfortable that enough water existed in the
Colorado River for their states to meet this obligation and still have the
ability to develop the 7.5 m.a.f./yr of consumption apportioned to
them. In urging the Colorado legislature to ratify the Compact,
Carpenter assured them:
It is evident that the States of the Upper Basin may safely guarantee
75,000,000 acre-feet aggregate delivery at Lee Ferry during each tenyear period. This would mean an average annual delivery of
,500,000 acre-feet as against 15,940,594 acre-feet present net annual
natural
average flow (100%) at Lee Ferry or 18,415,842 acre-feet river.
23
average annual flow (100%) on the basis of a "reconstructed"
Arthur Powell Davis, the Commissioner of Reclamation, backed
Carpenter's and the other Commissioners' assurances. Davis had prior
to and throughout the negotiations stated that plenty of water existed
in the Colorado River System to take care of all existing and future
anticipated uses.
Unfortunately, history has shown these optimistic assumptions
were just that. Since 1922, the undepleted flow of the Colorado River
at Lee Ferry has averaged only 14.2 m.a.f./yr. Ten-year periods with a
flow of 11.8 m.a.f./yr have occurred twice in this century. 2 4 Tree ring
studies have estimated the long-term average supply at5 13.5 m.a.f./yr,
and have put one ten-year period flow at 9.7 m.a.f./yr.1
Table II below, and its accompanying notes, provides a comparison
123. Supplemental Report, supra note 42, at 892-93.
124. UPPER COLORADO RIVERCOMM'N, FORTY-EIGHTHANNUALREP., at 26 (1996).
125. David Meko et al., The Tree-Ring Record of Severe Sustained Drought, 31 WATER
RESOURCES BULL. 789, 799-800 (1995), reprinted in 1 THE POWEL CONSORTIUM 789
(1995).
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between the assumptions made in 1922 and what we now know with
the benefit of an additional eighty years of history.
TABLE II: COMPARISON OF CONSUMPTIVE USES, LOSSES, AND WATER
SUPPLY
(Values in Million Acre-Feet per Year)
Reconstructed average virgin flow at Lee Ferry
Long term reconstructed average
Lowest reconstructed ten-year period
Lowest ten-year period of record
Lower Basin tributary inflow
Total Available Water Supply (Mainstem)
Upper Basin Uses
Upper Basin Reservoir Evaporation
Total Upper Basin Uses
Lower Basin Mainstem Uses
Lower Basin Reservoir Evaporation
Total Lower Basin Mainstem Uses
Delivery to Mexico and Welton-Mohawk bypass
Total Mainstem Uses

1922
17.5'

3.0'
20.5
2.5
-

2.5
2.6 h
2.6
6.1

Present
15.0 b
13.5 d
9.7 d
11.8'
1.4'
11.1-16.4
4.2 g
0.5 g
4.7
8.3'
1.8'
10.1
1.6
16.4

Table II Notes
For the period 1903-1922. Delph E. Carpenter
reported this amount
to the House of Representatives. HistoricalMemorandum In Re Colorado River
and Brief of Law of Interstate Compacts: Hearings on H.R. 6821 Before the House
Judiciary Comm., 67th Cong. (1921) (brief written by Delph E. Carpenter). In
his Comments to Congress on the Colorado River Compact, Commissioner of
Reclamation, Arthur Powell Davis, estimated the reconstructed flow at 18.1
m.a.f./yr. 64 CONG. REC. 2714 (1923).
b This is the long-term average
for the period 1906-1999.
UPPER
COLORADO RIVER COMM'N, FIFty-FIRsT ANNUAL REP., at 25 (1999).
Critical ten-year averages for the periods 1931-1940
and 1954-1963.
For the twelve-year period 1953-1964, the average annual virgin flow at Lee
Ferry was only 11.6 m.a.f. Id. at 26.
d
David Meko et al., The Tree-Ring Record of Severe Sustained Drought,
31
WATER RESOURCES BULL. 789, 799-800 (1995), reprinted in 1 THE POWELL
CONSORTIUM 789 (1995).
e Telephone Interview with Wayne E. Cook, Executive
Director, Upper
Colorado River Commission (Mar. 2001); Telephone Interview with Phil
Mutz, New Mexico Commissioner, Upper Colorado River Commission (Mar.
2001).
' Delph E. Carpenter, In Re Colorado River Compact, Report before the
Governor of Colorado, Oliver H. Shroup (Dec. 15, 1922), reprinted in SENATE
JOURNAL, 24th Gen. Assembly, at 78-79 (Colo. 1923)
g UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMM'N, UPPER COLORADO RIVER STATES
DEPLETION SCHEDULE (2000).
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In his comments to Congress on the Colorado River Compact,

Commissioner of Reclamation, Arthur Powell Davis estimated the Lower
Basin mainstem uses at 2.6 m.a.f./yr. 64 CONG. REC. 2715 (1923).
i Memorandum from Jayne Harkins, Manager, River Operations, U.S.
Dep't of Interior re: Estimate of 2000 Colorado River Water Use (Dec. 27,
2000) (on file with author). However, 2000 is a year of declared surplus.
Under a normal year, Lower Basin mainstem uses are limited to 7.5 m.a.f./yr.
j The Bureau of Reclamation Consumptive Uses and Losses Report,
1981-1985, shows total Lower Basin reservoir evaporation of about 1.0
m.a.f./yr. Table, LOWER COLORADO RIER BASIN: COLORADO RIVER MAIN STEM
ESTIMATED RESERVOIR EVAPORATION AND CHANNEL Loss (1981-1985) (on file
However, through informal communication, current
with author).
accounting of the Lower Colorado Region of the Bureau of Reclamation
estimates 1.8 m.a.f./yr. Telephone Interview with Wayne E. Cook, Executive
Director, Upper Colorado River Commission (Mar. 2001).
Because of the delivery obligation in Article III(d) of the Compact,
the burden of the forecasted supply deficiency falls directly on the
Upper Division States. If the Upper Basin has a firm obligation to
allow a ten-year average of 7.5 m.a.f. to go to the Lower Basin each
year, this obligation limits its use to what remains in the Colorado
River. The amount left depends upon hydrologic cycles. Based on its
hydrologic analysis and interpretation of the Law of the River, the
Bureau of Reclamation's official estimate of the water available to the
Upper Basin is only 6.0 m.a.f./yr. The Upper Division States disagree
with this estimate, but the issue is not yet ripe since Upper Basin
depletions remain below this amount. As shown on the chart above,
total Upper Basin use
2 6 and reservoir evaporation is only about 4.7
m.a.f./yr at this time.
Because of the uncertainty about how much water will ultimately
be available under the Colorado River Compact, the Upper Colorado
River Compact allocated the entitlement to use water under the
Colorado River Compact among the Upper Division States on a
percentage basis. Therefore, unlike the Lower Division States whose
allocations are firm, the allocation of each Upper Division state is
uncertain and variable. For example, Article III(a) (2) of the Upper
Colorado River Compact entitled Colorado to deplete the Colorado
River by 51.75% of the available Upper Basin consumptive use in any
year. 217 Thus, if the total available to the Upper Basin is 6.0 m.a.f./yr,
Colorado may deplete the Colorado River by 3.079 m.a.f./yr. 28 If the
Upper Basin entitlement is 7.5 m.a.f./yr, Colorado may deplete the

126. Additional discussion of the problem of the underestimation of supply is found
in Carlson & Boles, supra note 22, at 21-34.
127. Upper Colorado River Compact, supranote 74, § 37-62-101, art. III(a) (2).
128. ENDANGERED FiSH FLOW AND COLORADO IvER COMPACT WATER DEV.
WORKGROUP, FINAL REP., COLORADO RIVER COMPACT WATER DEv. PROJECTION, at 12

(1995) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
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Colorado River
by 3.885 m.a.f./yr."9 Colorado's current uses are about
3
2.5 m.a.f./yr

1

B. THE COMPACT NEGOTIATORS LEFT UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Because of their water supply estimates, the negotiators thought
they left some room in which to work. The negotiators based their
discussions on what they felt were the reasonable water supply needs in
each basin-7.5 m.a.f./yr-and gave the Lower Basin an additional
million acre feet to allow for Lower Basin tributary use. Because they
had not allocated all the water in the Colorado River, they felt that
extra water remained for some intentionally unresolved issues.
For example, the negotiators provided in Article Ill(c) that the
states would handle any obligation to deliver water to Mexico under a
treaty by using water surplus to that allocated under Article 111(a) and
(b). If no surplus exists, the Upper and Lower Basins are to share
equally in meeting any such deficiency. The Lower Basin argues no
such surplus exists, and the Upper Basin therefore has a delivery
obligation. Thus, in addition to its 75 m.a.f. delivery obligation, the
Upper Basin potentially faces the added burden of contributing onehalf of the 1.5 m.a.f. Mexican Treaty obligation, and possibly the
transit losses between Lee Ferry and the Mexican border.
However, the Upper Basin States assert they are under no
obligation to contribute any water to Mexico. They argue that since
the total Lower Basin consumptive use has exceeded its total
apportionment of 8.5 m.a.f./yr, the Lower Basin is using surplus water,
and must reduce its consumptive use to 8.5 m.a.f./yr before the Upper
Basin can have any obligation. The chart above shows Lower Basin
mainstem consumptive uses of 8.0 m.a.f./yr. If one adds in Lower
Basin tributary uses, even deducting for groundwater overdraft, total
Lower Basin consumptive use is currently in excess of its 8.5 m.a.f./yr
allocation. The Upper Basin States argue this excess use eliminates
any burden the Upper Basin might otherwise have toward Mexican
Treaty deliveries. Resolution of the question may depend on how the
Compact accounts for Lower Basin tributary use.
The Compact, in Article VII, does not explicitly resolve the
question of Indian reserved rights-how much they are, or their
priority."s2 In Arizona v. California, the United States Supreme Court
answered that question for five Lower Basin Indian tribes, adjudicating

129. Id. at 9.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Despite stating that it was not interpreting the Compact, the practical effect of
the Court's decision in Arizona v. Californiawas to hold that the 7.5 m.a.f. allocation to
the Lower Basin in Article III(a) of the Compact was of mainstream water, and the
allocation of 1.0 m.a.f. to the Lower Basin in Article III(b) of the Compact was of
tributary water. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 557-58, 565-69 (1963).
132. "Nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting the obligations of the
United States of America to Indian tribes." Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art.
VII.
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to them reserved rights totaling 900,000 acre-feet.'33 The Court's
decision also made clear that in the Lower Basin, use of mainstem
water is charged against the allocation of the state in which the
consumptive use of that water is made.'34 However, both the Upper
and Lower Basins have not quantified Indian reserved rights of
Thus, the impact of this
potentially enormous magnitude.
quantification is still unknown.
C. THE NEGOTIATORS DID NOT FORESEE THE EMERGENCE OF URBAN
DEMANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND RECREATIONAL VALUES

The Compact negotiators did predict increasing demands for
water in the basin. Much of their predictions were defensive in nature,
since a prediction of future demand served as a justification for a
higher claim of entitlement in the Compact negotiations. Irrigation
demand was the primary consideration in these predictions and
calculations of present use. Early in the Compact negotiations, the
Commissioners discussed an allocation formula based on irrigable
acreage. Claims based on irrigable acreage provided some objective
measurement of future demand and avoided pure speculation.
The negotiators could not foresee the influx of population to the
western United States, the magnitude of the shift from rural
communities to urban cities, or the increase in resort, tourism, and
recreational demands such as golf courses, snowmaking, and flat water
and instream recreation. In the negotiations, the parties considered
Denver's potential transbasin demand. However, the negotiators felt
that southern Nevada's potential demands were negligible.3 6
Additionally, areas not discussed included Los Angeles and Phoenix.
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Upper Basin States'
concerns included the potential water demands of massive oil shale
development and whether their Compact allocation would adequately
accommodate such demands. Although a push to develop oil shale no
longer exists, these changing economic circumstances illustrate that
the Commissioners could not foresee future demands on the Colorado
River. These changing conditions also underscore the wisdom of
Delph Carpenter's desire to preserve a defined share of the Colorado
River in perpetuity for the Upper Basin, so that the Upper Basin could
meet changing circumstances without interstate conflict or without a
rush to premature water development simply to protect against claims
in the Lower Basin.
133. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 596.
134. Id. at 590.
135. For example, in the 1928 Senate debates on the Boulder Canyon Project Act,
Senator Pittman of Nevada stated that "Nevada has already admitted that it can use
only an insignificant quantity, 300,000 acre-feet." Id. at 578.
136. In response to a question from Arizona Congressman, Carl Hayden, Herbert
Hoover responded that "[n]o data are at hand in regard to any proposed diversion
from the drainage area of the Colorado River in the States of Arizona, California, or
Nevada unless the Imperial Valley diversion be so considered." 64 CONG. REc. 2714
(1923).
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Along with changing economic circumstances in the West has
come a shift in environmental and recreation values. The Endangered
Species Act has forced the reoperation of virtually every federal
reservoir in the Upper Basin. Each facility, and the rivers above and
below it, has generated significant recreation economies. These new
demands on the system have lead some to question whether the huge
reservoirs on the system will ever operate as the Compact negotiators
intended-fluctuating from full to empty as drought cycles come and
go. Moreover, lawsuits filed by environmental organizations have
asserted that the Endangered Species Act creates an overriding
obligation and limitation on the operation of federal reservoirs, 7 and
even requires the delivery of additional water to Mexico to avoid
jeopardy to listed endangered species in Mexico.'38
D. INTERBASIN WATER TRANSFERS AND MARKETING WAS NOT
CONTEMPLATED BY THE COMPACT NEGOTIATIONS AND IS ILLEGAL UNDER
THE LAW OF THE RIVER

Increasing demands in California and southern Nevada, combined
with the continued underutilization in the Upper Basin of its
consumptive use allocation, have encouraged proposals to sell or lease
water between the Basins. Proponents of water marketing argue the
Upper Division States should be able to sell or lease to Lower Basin
entities their unused entitlements to the use of water from the
Colorado River System, or private parties should be able to sell or lease
water rights created under state law. Although proponents have made
many proposals, the three most notorious proposals are the "Galloway
Proposal," the "RCG (Resource Conservation Group) Proposal," and
the "Roan Creek Proposal."
In 1984, the Galloway Group, Ltd. entered into an option with the
San Diego County Water Authority (a member agency of the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California), to lease 300,000
to 500,000 acre-feet per year of water released from future planned
reservoirs on the White or Yampa Rivers in Colorado. According to
the proposal, the Upper Basin under the Compact, and Colorado
under the Upper Colorado River Compact, would debit the water
released for use in San Diego to their respective allocations.
The 1989 RCG Proposal sought to create three types of "water" for
sale or lease from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin. The first type
of water ("Type 1") was undeveloped, unused water in the Upper
Basin, currently flowing to and used in the Lower Basin. Type 1 water
would include water the Upper Basin could, in the future, develop and
consumptively use. The second type of water ("Type 2") was water
stored in Upper Basin Reservoirs, for which there were contracts but
no present use. This type of water was the same as Type 1 water,
137. S.W. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515
(9th Cir. 1998).
138. Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, No. 1700CV01544 (D.C. Cir. filed June 28,
2000).

Issue 2

AN UPPERBASIN PERSPECTIVE

except that Type 2 water was subject to contracts of potential users who
had not yet developed their uses. An example of Type 2 water was
water stored in Fontenelle Reservoir in Wyoming under contract to
industrial users who had no current demand. The third type of water
("Type 3") was water presently consumed by irrigated agriculture in
the Upper Basin. Thus, creating Type 3 water under the RCG
Proposal required Upper Basin water users to dry up irrigated acreage,
temporarily or on a rotating basis, and to forego present consumptive
use for sale or lease in the Lower Basin. RCG proposed to create
"pools" of Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 water for sale or lease in the
Lower Basin.
The Roan Creek Proposal, developed by Chevron Oil Shale
Company, was substantively identical to the Galloway Proposal.
Chevron proposed to construct a reservoir on Roan Creek near Grand
Junction in Colorado and to lease water to Nevada pending ultimate
development and use of the water for oil shale development in
Colorado.
The Galloway, RCG, and Roan Creek promoters sought to involve
the Colorado River Basin states and to convince the states that an
arrangement with private enterprise as a "facilitator" was necessary for
their project to take place. The groups tried to sell the concept on an
affirmance of the entitlements to use water in the Upper Basin and on
the development of a stream of revenue to use in the Upper Basin for
new water project development or other state needs.
The states resisted these proposals for a variety of reasons. Among
other things, the states' concerns included that the concepts were
legally impossible, would open an unregulated "water market" on the
Colorado River, 1 s9and that such an arrangement would destroy
interstate comity.

There are many reasons why an interbasin "water market" is simply
illegal under the Law of the River, some of which are discussed below.
More fundamentally, however, it is also clear the very idea of a "water
market" is directly contrary to the basis and foundation of the Law of
the River.
The reciprocal, historical needs of the Upper and Lower Basins,
which remain valid today, are premised on the allocations embedded
in the Law of the River. The Lower Basin was in need of major
regulatory structures to alleviate the threat of flooding and to achieve
water development opportunities. The Upper Basin sought to avoid
the interstate imposition of the prior appropriation doctrine, and to
The
protect future development rights in the Upper Basin.
139.

More recently, the state of Utah has "broken ranks" with its fellow Upper

Division States. Utah's Governor Leavitt suggested his state should investigate the idea
of leasing its unused apportionment to states in the Lower Division, arguing that the

Endangered Species Act and other environmental laws, and a lack of demand, may
prevent Utah from ever using its full entitlement. Governor Leavitt proposed that

money raised from the lease could be used to meet infrastructure needs in Utah. The
proposal was met with opposition by the Upper Division States, and with lukewarm

enthusiasm from the Lower Division States.
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operational and regulatory system of the Law of the River meets these
needs. The very basis of the bargain in the Compact is the Lower
Basin's agreement that the Upper Basin has a peretual allocation of
the right to consume a given amount of water. 4 In exchange, the
Upper Basin agreed to let pass to the Lower Basin, without charge, an
water for which it lacked a reasonably anticipated consumptive need.
Creating a water market in which the Upper Basin charges the Lower
Basin for this water, would undermine this fundamental agreement
between the Basins.
Additionally, an interbasin water market violates the Compact's
premise that the prior appropriation doctrine does not apply interstate
on the Colorado River. Water markets, changes of water rights, and
transfers are hallmarks of the prior appropriation doctrine.
Therefore, an interbasin water market brings about the very result the
Upper Basin negotiators of the Compact sought to avoid-making
water and/or water rights an article of interstate commerce and
layering the Law of the River with an interstate prior appropriation
doctrine. This result allows the economic and political muscle of the
Lower Division States to override the future of the Upper Division
States. The result also allows the Lower Basin to continue economic
development at the expense of the Upper Basin.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the concept of an interbasin
water market has no basis under the Law of the River. This is true for
any of the "types" of water contemplated under recently proposed
marketing schemes: (1) unused apportionments of the Upper Division
States; (2) water stored in the Upper Basin for later release and use in
the Lower Basin; or (3) water presently consumed in the Upper Basin,
the use of which would be foregone so as to allow an equivalent
amount of use in the Lower Basin.
A summary of three of the many ways an interbasin water market is
illegal under the Law of the River follows.
1. Interbasin Water Sales or Transfers Would Violate the Colorado
River Compact
Article I of the Colorado River Compact specifies that the basis of
the Compact is the apportionment not of water itself, but of the use of
water. 4 2 Article III(a) makes an apportionment, "in perpetuity,"
140. Compact, supranote 1, § 37-61-101, art. I11(a).
141. Id., art. III(e).
142. Article I reads in its entirety as follows:
The major purposes of this compact are to provide for the equitable
division and apportionment of the use of the waters of the Colorado River
System; to establish the relative importance of different beneficial uses of
water; to promote interstate comity; to remove causes of present and future
controversies; and to secure the expeditious agricultural and industrial
development of the Colorado River Basin, the storage of its waters and the
protection of life and property from floods. To these ends the Colorado
River Basin is divided into two Basins, and an apportionment of the use of
part of the water of the Colorado River System is made to each of them with
the provision that further equitable apportionments may be made.
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between Upper and Lower Basins, not of water, but of the right to
To reinforce this concept,
"exclusive beneficial consumptive use.
Article III(d) prevents the Upper Division States from "depleting" the
flow of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry below 75 m.a.f. in any ten-year
running average." Moreover, Article III(e) provides the Upper Basin
cannot withhold unneeded water for use in the Upper Basin, if a need
exists for the water in the Lower Basin.'45
Once water passes Lee Ferry, and a use occurs in the Lower Basin,
that use is chargeable as a Lower Basin use. The Compact does not
provide an allocation of the "ownership" of water. It guarantees to
each Basin a right of use up to a specified maximum. This view is
consistent with the nature of water rights as usufructuary rights, and
expresses the intent of the Compact negotiators. 4 6 As a result, the
place of use, not the location of the water, determines to which Basin
that use is charged.
For a sale or transfer of an Upper Basin use to the Lower Basin to
occur, the Lower Basin must credit its uses and the Upper Basin debit
its uses. This debit/credit system would allow the Lower Basin to
consumptively use the amount of the water sale in excess of 75 m.a.f.
every ten years and require the Upper Basin to deliver the same
Id. § 37-61-101, art. I (emphasis added).
143. Article 111(a) reads in its entirety as follows:
There is hereby apportioned from the Colorado River System in
pepetuity to the Upper Basin and to the Lower Basin respectively the exclusive
beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre feet of water per annum, which
shall include all water necessary for the supply of any rights which may now
exist.
Id. § 37-61-101, art. 111(a) (emphasis added).
144. Article III(d) reads in its entirety as follows:
The States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river
at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre feet for
any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series
beginning with the first day of October next succeeding the ratification of
this compact.
Id. § 37-61-101, art. III(d) (emphasis added).
145. Article III(e) states in its entirety: "The States of the Upper Division shall not
withhold water, and the States of the Lower Division shall not require the delivery of
water, which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses." Id. § 3761-101, art. III(e).
146. At the compact negotiation, the following discussion occurred which reinforces
the notion that the intent of the negotiators was to apportion the use of water, not the
water itself.
CHAIRMAN HOOVER: I have doubts as to the ability of the Commission to
divide the water. You can divide the use of the water, but I don't believe you
can divide the water itself. That is the assumption of an ownership in the
body of the water, not the use of water and I think there are essentially
different legal principles if I understand anything about it. I will ask Mr.
Hamele what he thinks about that.
MR. HAMELE: That is true, Mr. Chairman. There is no property right in
running water and there couldn't be any division in a compact of this kind of
the actual water, because it is only the use that is in question. It passes on,
goes down and the very water that is used in the upper division is used again
in the lower division.
Minutes, Twenty-fifth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Bishop's Lodge, Santa
Fe, N.M. (Nov. 23, 1922).
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amount in excess of its ten-year delivery obligation. However, the
Compact does not include a provision for any such debit/credit
system. In fact, such accounting would violate the entire purpose of
the Compact in apportioning the right of use between the two Basins
in perpetuity, and thus, preserving a right of development in each of
the Basins.
An Upper Basin user could not capture water in a reservoir for
delivery to a use in a Lower Division state for the following reasons.
Article III(e) does not allow holding water in the Upper Basin if
needed in the Lower Basin. Furthermore, Article III(a) charges the
use of water in the Lower Basin against the Lower Basin use, and
Article III(d) counts the use as part of the Upper Basin delivery
obligation. Similarly, an Upper Basin user could not forego his use of
water and sell it to a Lower Basin user, since under the Compact, the
use and accounting of the delivery is the same. Moreover, the
Compact expressly forbids any Lower Basin water user from making a
claim on Upper Basin water. Article VIII provides that after the
Hoover Dam construction, only water stored in the Lower Basin "not
in conflict with Article III" could satisfy a claim of an appropriator in
the Lower Basin.'47 All other rights are satisfied "solely from the water
apportioned to that Basin in which they are situate."'
The Compact, ratified by each of the state legislatures and
consented to by Congress, effectuates a legislative equitable
apportionment and is federal law. 9 As such, it removes water as an
article of interstate commerce, 5 ' and thereby not only limits the
authority of each state to confer rights in excess of its limitations, but
also authorizes each state to enforce its terms.'
Therefore, the
limitations of the Compact constrain the authority of each state to
create water rights. No Upper Division state could confer upon any
appropriator the right to sell, lease, or transfer the right to use water
for use in a Lower Division state and have that right charged as a use in
the Upper Basin, because such a right cannot exist under the terms of
the Compact. Any other state signatory to the Compact could sue the
state attempting to create such a right, or could sue the United States
if the United States attempted to effectuate such a right by accounting
or delivery through federal reservoirs.'
Similarly, the states could not
agree to such a fundamental change in Compact accounting without
amending the Compact and obtaining congressional consent.
147. Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art. VIII.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104-05
(1938).
150. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 769 F.2d. 568, 569-70
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
151. Hinderlider,304 U.S. at 102.
152. Under federal law, the United States consents to suits by states in the event any
officer or agency of the United States does not comply with the compacts, Mexican
Treaty, the Decree in Arizona v. California,or the Colorado River Storage Project Act.
See 43 U.S.C. § 620m (1994).
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Interbasin Sales and Transfers Would Also Violate the Upper
Colorado River Compact

The Upper Colorado River Compact apportions among the Upper
Division States the consumptive use apportioned to the Upper Basin
by the Colorado River Compact. As a result, one can make a parallel
analysis of the Upper Colorado River Compact to the Colorado River
Compact. Article I states the purposes of the Upper Colorado River
Compact include "the equitable division and apportionment of the use
of the waters of the Colorado river system, the use of which was
apportioned in perpetuity to the upper basin by the Colorado [R]iver
[C]ompact."'53 Article III(a) (2) then makes the actual apportionment,
which is of "consumptive use per annum of the quantities resulting
from the application of... percentages to the total quantity of
consumptive use per annum appropriated in perpetuity to and
available for use each year by upper basin under the Colorado [R]iver
[C] ompact. " '
If an Upper Basin state attempted to create a water right for use in
the Lower Basin, it could not argue that it was consumptively using its
apportionment, since the use would not occur in that state, or even in
the Upper Basin.
Article III(b) (1) and (2) state that the
apportionment is of "man-made depletions" and that "[b]eneficial use
is the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to use." 5 ' Under
Article VI, depletions are determined by the "inflow-outflow method"
measured at Lee Ferry. Therefore, a state could not create a legal
fiction of a use in that state if consumption did not occur in such
state. 'Nor could a state forego the use of water under its
apportionment, but have the actual use occur in the Lower Basin,
since the state would not make such use consumptively in the Upper
Basin, and the inflow-outflow method could not account for the use at
Lee Ferry.
Article IX of the Upper Colorado River Compact accounts for the
use of water in the state of actual use by providing that the
construction of a reservoir for the storage and delivery of water to a
consumptive use in a lower Upper Basin state is specifically
contemplated, but that such use must be accounted as "within the
apportionment to such lower state made by [the Colorado River
Compact]."'"7 Article IX goes on to provide that any such reservoir is
subject to the rights of water users within that upper state to put the
full amount of that state's Upper Basin allocation to use.
The clear intent of the Upper Colorado River Compact is to put as
153. Upper Colorado River Compact, supra note 74, § 37-62-101, art. I (emphasis
added).
154. Id. § 37-62-101, art. Ill(a)(2).
155. Id. § 37-62-101, art. III(b)(1), (2).
156. Id. § 37-62-101, art. VI.
157. Id. § 37-62-101, art. IX. Although nonconsumptive uses such as instream flows
and power production are recognized under state law, such uses are not accounted for
under either the Colorado River Compact or the Upper Colorado River Compact.
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much of the Upper Basin water to use in the Upper Basin as possible,
before meeting the delivery obligation to the Lower Basin under the
Colorado River Compact. To this end, Article III(b) (3) allows a state
to exceed its apportionment, if such use will not deprive another state
of the use if its apportionment. Therefore, no one state in the Upper
Basin has authority to shepard water through, or prevent the use of
such water by, another Upper Basin state. Article XV(b) specifically
reserves to each of the states the authority to regulate the
"appropriation, use and control of water, the consumptive use
of
which is apportioned and available to such state by this compact."1 58 As
a result, no way exists for a water user in one Upper Basin state to
either store and release water, or forego the consumptive use of water,
and guarantee to a Lower Basin purchaser that the water will be
deliverable to Lee Ferry or that another Upper Basin state will not
consume the water.
3. Interbasin Sales and Transfers Would Violate the Terms of the
Decree of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California
For any interbasin water market to operate, the Upper Basin needs
to generate water, account for it, and transport it through the Upper
Basin to the Lower Basin, and then account and deliver it from Lake
Mead to the ultimate state of use and to the ultimate user in the Lower
Basin. An Upper Basin-to-Lower Basin marketing plan could not
accomplish this necessary accounting and delivery in the Lower Basin
under the Decree in Arizona v. California.
In Arizona v. California,the Supreme Court based its reasoning not
upon the 1922 Colorado River Compact or the Doctrine of Equitable
Apportionment, but upon the power of Congress in the enactment of
the Boulder Canyon Project Act ("Act"). The Decree makes clear that
once water passes Lee Ferry, it loses any legal characterization it may
have otherwise had, and becomes "mainstream water," "controlled by
the United States." 5 " Moreover, the Court held that the Act precludes
any use of water from the mainstream except pursuant to contract with
the United States and subject only to the allocations in the Act."6 The
158. Upper Colorado River Compact, supra note 74, § 37-62-101, art. XV(b).
159. Article I(B) of the Decree defines "[m]ainstream" as "the mainstream of the
Colorado River downstream from Lee Ferry within the United States, including the
reservoirs thereon." Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 340 (1964). Article I(E) of
the Decree defines "[wiater controlled by the United States" as "water in Lake Mead,
Lake Mohave, Lake Havasu and all other water in the mainstream below Lee Ferry and
within the United States." Id
160. The Court stated:
Having undertaken this beneficial project, Congress, in several provisions of
the Act, made it clear that no one should use mainstream waters save in strict
compliance with the scheme set up by the Act.... To emphasize that water
could be obtained from the Secretary alone, § 5 further declared, "No person
shall have or be entitled to have the use for any purpose of the water
stored.., except by contract made as herein stated."... Moreover, contrary
to the Master's conclusion, we hold that the Secretary in choosing between
users within each State and in settling the terms of his contracts is not bound
by these sections to follow state law.
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Decree strictly enjoins both the Secretary of the Interior and each of
the Lower Division States from acting otherwise.
Therefore, an Upper Basin water user cannot possibly enter into a
contract for the delivery of water to a Lower Basin water user, since the
Lower Basin user can contract only with the United States.
Additionally, water use in each of the Lower Division States would still
be subject to the overall apportionments set forth in the Decree.
Thus, for example, total California mainstream consumptive water
uses in a "normal" year could not exceed 4.4 m.a.f., unless authorized
and determined by the Secretary of Interior.16 ' As a result, no utility
exists in a Lower Basin user seeking to purchase Upper Basin water,
because the total allowable water use from the mainstream in the
Lower Basin is only pursuant to federal contract and within the
limitation of use established by the federal government for that state.
A similar analysis exists as to every aspect of the Law of the River.
For example, the operational constraints established in the Colorado
River Basin Project Act provide strict limitations on the purposes for
which the Secretary may release water from Lake Powell. Additionally,
export statutes in the Upper Basin, for example, in the case of
Colorado, provide that Colorado and the Upper Basin credit delivery
of water to the Lower Basin against its delivery requirement.
Simply stated, an interbasin "water market" is an anathema to the
letter of and the historical and political basis for the Law of the River.
Such a market would undermine, if not destroy, the certainty of supply
and allocation negotiated in the Law of the River and the basis upon
which the states and the federal government have developed to work
toward the resolution of the issues before us today. This strong
opposition to an interbasin water market, and the resulting "water
raids" that the Lower Basin could perpetrate on the Upper Basin, is
one of the reasons Colorado has insisted California resolve its
dependence on water surplus in excess of its basic allocation in the
Lower Basin, preferably within its own state, and not by interbasin
water marketing.
XI. CONCLUSION
This article, Part I of a two part series, provides an overview of the
history of the development of the Law of the River from an Upper
Basin perspective. Through his desire to promote greater certainty
and security of water supply allocation, Colorado's negotiator, Delph
Carpenter, had several goals in mind in the drafting of the Colorado
River Compact. He sought the assurance that Colorado could develop
a defined share of the Colorado River in perpetuity, as needs and
economic conditions dictate. He sought to eliminate the operation of
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 579, 580, 586 (1963).
161. The Secretary of the Interior authorized the use of water by California in 1991
and 1992, in excess of California's basic apportionment and despite a "normal"

declaration, but on the basis that California water users would be required to repay in
a subsequent year any water so used.
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the prior appropriation doctrine applied on an interstate basis. He
sought to preserve state autonomy and sovereignty over intrastate
water appropriation and administration. He sought to avoid the threat
of interstate litigation among the states and between the states and the
federal government. Finally, he sought to create a foundation for the
comprehensive development and regulation of the Colorado River.
At its core, the Colorado River Compact provides the fundamental
allocation and assurances sought by Carpenter. Federal laws, the
Upper Basin Compact, the Mexican Treaty, and the Arizona v.
Californiadecision and Decree followed the Compact. These elements
of the Law of the River built upon the foundation laid by that initial
allocation.
In fact, it was the assurance of a secure interstate allocation that
allowed the states and the federal government to move forward with
the development of the great public works on the Colorado River, and
the operational mechanisms that run those works.
Although
uncertainties remain, some not understood by the original Compact
negotiators and others left intentionally for future resolution, the
Compact and laws that followed it provide a framework for the
resolution of those issues. Operational changes made to system
reservoirs in response to the Endangered Species Act and the Grand
Canyon Protection Act illustrate the flexibility within the fundamental
allocation.
Today, one of the most important issues on the Colorado River
remains California's continued reliance on surplus water in excess of
its basic apportionment. Part II of this article will discuss the
chronology of the negotiations between the states, federal
government, and Indian tribes concerning the potential resolution of
this problem. In these negotiations, the Upper Basin States have
attempted to maintain the foundation of security of perpetual
allocation of supply and the protection of their ability to use and
develop water under the Law of the River. The most important Upper
Basin principle is that the resolution of the California issue should
take place in the Lower Basin, in a manner consistent with the Law of
the River, and without impairing the Upper Basin's ability to exercise
its right to consume water in the Upper Basin as economic need
dictates.

